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THE CREATION OF AN OMBUDSMAN:
THE GUARDIANSHIP AND ADVOCACY COMMISSION
Donald Paull *
The Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission recently
was created by state law. It is an independent agency authorized to
oversee the work of both public and private mental health care
providers. The author, characterizing the agency as an "om-
budsman," examines its statutory functions and projects its possible
organizational structure. Rights of the mentally ill and develop-
mentally disabled, as enumerated under the new law, are analyzed.
Mr. Paull also discusses similar agencies created by other states
and compares them to the new Illinois Commission.
Recognizing a need for comprehensive reform of the civil and criminal
laws dealing with the mentally ill and mentally retarded, 1 the Governor of
Illinois created the Governor's Commission for revision of the Illinois Mental
Health Code in 1973.2 The Governor's Commission issued its report in
1976, 3 culminating well over three years of work. This report addressed var-
ious problems of mentally ill 4 and developmentally disabled 5 individuals
that were not adequately provided for in the 1967 revision of the Code. 6
Throughout its recommendations, the Commision focused upon the central
themes of respect for the individual's worth, the individual's right to receive
adequate services, and the right of the individual to minimal governmental
intrusion in the form of restrictions on liberty and self-determination. 7 The
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of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Report of the Governor's Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois
(1976) vi [hereinafter cited as Report].
2. Exec. Order No. 10 (1973). This Commission [hereinafter referred to as the Governor's
Commission] was chaired by Judge Joseph Schneider of the Circuit Court of Cook County and
its members represented various professional, citizen, and consumer groups.
3. Report, supra note 1.
4. "'Mentally ill" is defined as "subject to involuntary admission" under the Act. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 90 1/2, § 1-130 (Supp. 1979). A person who is subject to involuntary admission is one
who: (1) may reasonably be expected to inflict serious physical harm on himself or herself, or on
another, in the near future; or (2) is unable to provide for his or her own basic needs because of
mental illness. Id. § 1-119.
5. The Act defines a developmentally disabled person as one who: (1) has a disability either
attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism; or (2) has another condi-
tion resulting in an impairment similar to that caused by mental retardation and requires serv-
ices similar to those needed by mentally retarded persons. Id. § 1-106. Mental retardation is
defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" existing "concurrently with
impairment in adaptive behavior" and originating before age 18. Id. § 1-116.
6. Approved Aug. 14, 1967. 1967 I1l. Laws 3004, S.B. No. 1349. Effective Jan. 1, 1968.
7. Report, supra note 1, at vi.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
report contained a proposed mental health code formulating the means for
resolving issues attendant to an individual's fitness to stand trial, 8 a deter-
mination that interfaces the criminal and civil mental health laws. The report
also recommended the creation of three new agencies to protect the rights of
defined classes of disadvantaged individuals: the Office of the State Guar-
dian, the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Legal Advocacy
Service, and the Human Rights Authority. 9
In 1978, the Governor signed into law a number of acts embodying most
of the recommendations of the Governor's Commission. The major focus of
this article is the Guardianship and Advocacy Act 1 0 that merged the pro-
posed three agencies into a single agency entitled the Guardianship and Ad-
vocacy Commission11 (Commission). The net effect of this legislation is to
create an ombudsman 12 to protect the rights of delineated classes of dis-
advantaged persons. 13 This article will explore the structure, purpose, and
anticipated impact of the Commission in its role as an ombudsman.
THE COMMISSION
The disadvantaged persons protected by the Act cannot effectively repre-
sent their own needs or concerns. The Act solves this problem by providing,
in effect, an ombudsman to speak on their behalf. 14  Since an ombudsman is
a government official empowered to investigate complaints brought against
other officials, 15 he or she must have clearly defined authority to function
8. Id. at 6.
9. See Schmidt, Illinois Proposed New Mental Health Code: The Need for Advocacy, 66
ILL. B.J. 402 (1978), for an excellent discussion of certain proposals arising from the Governor's
Commission.
10. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 701 (Cum. Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as G & A Act].
The Guardianship and Advocacy Act was first enacted as two separate acts. The Guardianship
and Mental Health Advocacy Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1416 (1978), 1978 Il. Laws 1543 originated
in the Illinois legislature as S. 253. It was sponsored in the Senate by Senators Daley and
Schaffer and in the House of Representative Beatty, Marovitz, and Telcser. The Act was signed
into law and became effective on Sept. 5, 1978. The Mental Health Advocacy Act Amendments
of 1979, Pub. Act No. 80-1487 1979 Ill. Laws 2020 (amending Pub. Act No. 80-1416 (1978)),
originated in the legislature as S. 273. It was sponsored in the Senate by Senators Schaffer and
Daley and in the House of Representatives Sandquist, Marovitz, and Daniel Houlihan. It was
passed into law and became effective on Jan. 8, 1979. Both pieces of legislation were codified as
the Guardianship and Advocacy Act. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 701.
11. Id. §§ 702(b), 703.
12. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text infra.
13. The disadvantaged persons benefitted by the Act are the mentally ill and the develop-
mentally disabled. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
14. Id.
15. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 800 (1974) defines "ombudsman" as "a gov-
ernment official . . . appointed to receive and investigate complaints made by individuals
against abuses or capricious acts of public officials." According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1968), the ombudsman concept is that "[a] citizen aggrieved by an official's action or
inaction should be able to state his grievance to an influential functionary empowered to in-
vestigate and express conclusions." Id. at 1238.
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with any degree of effectiveness. Although the word "ombudsman" does not
appear anywhere in the Act, it is clear that in creating the Guardianship and
Advocacy Commission, the legislature created such a collective "person." 16
Differences exist between the agency created by the Act and the recom-
mendations made by the Governor's Commission. For example, the de-
velopmentally disabled person was not directly covered by the original Act,
despite the recommendations of the Governor's Commission to create agen-
cies accommodating both the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled.
This situation arose because in the interim, Illinois, under federal authoriza-
tion, 17 created i8 a separate Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Authority
(IDDAA). 19  Amendments to the Act, 2 0 however, have remedied the situa-
tion. The Guardianship and Advocacy Commission currently extends its
services to all "eligible persons," defined as persons "who have received, are
receiving, have requested, or may be in need of mental health services, or
are 'developmentally disabled' or 'persons disabled' .. . ."21 These services
can include, but are not limited to "examination, diagnosis, evaluation,
treatment, care, training, psychotherapy, pharmaceuticals, after-care, habili-
tation, and rehabilitation .... ."22 In contrast, the Governor's Commission
originally intended to serve the "mentally disabled," 23 a classification includ-
ing anyone who has, or is alleged to have, a mental disorder or developmen-
tal disability. 24  It is now apparent that the Act's definition of eligible per-
sons is sufficiently broad to allow the new agency to assume the functions of
the IDDAA.
25
16. The ombudsman functions of the Commission are mainly concentrated in one of its
divisions, the Human Rights Authority. This division of the Commission is subdivided into
regional authorities whose members are appointed by the Commission. G & A Act, supra note
10, § 714. Extensive powers are accorded to the regional authorities to enable them to monitor
and resolve complaints against state agencies. Id. §§ 717-28. See also notes 49-58 and accom-
panying text infra. The Human Rights Authority and its subsidiary regional authorities are
closely associated with the other divisions of the Commission, the Office of the State Guardian,
and the Legal Advocacy Service that also have ombudsman characteristics. See notes 59-71 and
accompanying text infra.
17. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081
(1976). This act provides for an allotment of federal funds to a state with a system to protect and
advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities. id. § 6012(a)(1). Such a system
must have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to
ensure the protection of such rights. Id. § 6012(a)(2)(A).
18. Ostensibly the IDDAA was created by an executive order, but no signed executive
order was identified or found.
19. Federal law required that the system be independent of any state agency providing
treatment, habilitation, or services to the developmentally disabled. Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(2)(B) (1976).
20. See note 10 supra.
21. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 702(g).
22. Id. § 702(e).
23. Report, supra note 1, at 143.
24. Id. at 142.
25. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 702(j). The funding for the IDDAA ran out in January,
1980, and the Commission may assume some of its duties.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:475
ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND FUNCTIONS
The Guardianship and Advocacy Commission consists of nine members
who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. 26 It meets a minimum of four times a year and annually elects a chair-
person. 27 The Commission generally formulates policy guidelines 28 and es-
tablishes regions 29 that become the primary focal points for the Human
Rights Authority. Any action by a regional authority is subject to review by
the Commission.3 0 The Commission also hires a director 3 l and staff,32 re-
views and evaluates the operations of its three divisions,33 and prepares its
budget 3 4 and annual report.3 5 Private, federal, and other public funds, in
addition to state funds, may be received to support the divisions,36 and the
Commission may recommend regulations for safeguarding the rights of eligi-
ble persons to any state agency or service provider.3 7 In addition, the
Commission is responsible for recommending legislative action 38 and taking
any other reasonable action to fulfill its purpose. 3 9
The Director and Staff
The Director implements the policies of the Commission and coordinates
the activities of the three divisions. 40 It is the Director's responsibility to
organize and administer programs providing legal counsel for all eligible per-
sons. 4 1 The Director also examines the needs of individuals eligible for
legal counsel and delineates the resources necessary to meet their needs. 42
In addition, the Director is responsible for instituting legal procedures that
enforce the duties and powers of the Guardianship Commission. 43
26. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 704(a).
27. Id. § 704(c). The first chairman was elected on May 11, 1979.
28. Id. § 705(c).
29. Id. § 705(a). One way in which the regions might be organized would be to establish
seven regions, corresponding to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Dis-
abilities regions.
30. Id. § 705(c).
31. Id. § 705(d). The first director was appointed on October 2, 1979.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 705(e).
34. Id. § 7 05(g).
35. Id. § 705(h).
36. Id. § 705(j).
37. Id. § 706(a). These regulations, as well as the rules and regulations for the conduct of
the divisions, id. § 705(i), presumably will be subject to the Administrative Procedures Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1001-1021 (1977). G & A Act, supra note 10, ' 706(b).
38. Id. ' 706(b).
39. Id. ' 706(c).
40. 1d. ' 707.
41. Id. § 708(1).
42. 1d. § 708(2).
43. 1d. ' 708(3).
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Certain staff positions can be identified in a report prepared by the
Bureau of the Budget before the Act was passed. 44 Two such positions, the
Commission Counsel and the Commission Information Officer, are directly
responsibie to the Director.4 5 The two primary functions of the Information
Officer are to produce the legislatively mandated annual report 4 6 and to
disseminate information about the availability of the Commission's services.
The functions of the Commission Counsel are more diverse. Counsel must
review rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission, advise the
Director on legal disputes arising between the divisions, and coordinate liti-
gation activities.
The report by the Bureau of the Budget allows for two Deputy Director
positions, also reporting directly to the Director.4 7 The position of Deputy
Director for Programming and Planning can be viewed in two ways. First,
the position could have the limited purpose of planning activities among the
various divisions and evaluating their work. The position also can be broadly
viewed as actively administering the three divisions with the advice of the
Director. The Deputy Director for Management Services is in charge of var-
ious support functions such as personnel, fiscal arrangements, procurement,
and informational services. An organizational alternative gives the ad-
ministrative assistant the responsibility for program coordination, planning,
and evaluation. 48
The Divisions
There are three divisions of the Guardianship Commission: the Human
Rights Authority, the Office of the State Guardian, and the Legal Advocacy
Service. The division with the clearest function at this point is the Human
Rights Authority. Its duty is to coordinate the activities of the regional au-
thorities created by the Guardianship Commission. The Human Rights Au-
thority is composed of several boards, 49 each consisting of nine members
appointed by the Commission. 50 Each regional board elects a chairperson
and then meets at least once every two months. 51 It must investigate com-
44. Id. § 705(a). This report was an informal document made available to the legislative and
executive arms of state government. See Appendix, fig. I, for a flow chart representing the
Illinois Bureau of Budget's suggested organizational structure. See Appendix, figs. I1-IV, for flow
charts illustrating alternative suggestions.
45. See Appendix, fig. I. See also Appendix, figs. Il-IV.
46. G & A Act, srpra note 10, § 705(h).
47. See Appendix, fig. 1.
48. See Appendix, fig. IV. For a discussion of the implication of the various proposals for the
organization of the entire agency see notes 49-80 and accompanying text infra.
49. See Appendix, fig. I.
50. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 714.
51. Id.
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plaints alleging violations of rights 52 and can investigate sua sponte. 53  Each
regional board may conduct hearings 54 and notify the state agency, service
provider, or person investigated of its recommendations. 55  It may also refer
a matter for further consideration to the Commission; to any state, federal,
or local agency; or to other appropriate persons. 56  It should be noted that
the scope of the Human Rights Authority's function is quite broad, applying
to both public and private service providers. 7
Regional authorities are to be created under the auspices of the Human
Rights Authority. 58 It is essential that adequate information be made available
to the regional authorities, and ultimately to the Commission, regarding the
quality of services rendered to eligible persons. Mental health professionals
employed by the Commission will supply most of this necessary information.
In addition, legal supervision will be required to determine whether the
services provided meet legal tests established by state and federal courts and
to recommend new legal actions that will advance the rights of mentally ill
and developmentally disabled persons.
The second division, the Office of the State Guardian, has two major func-
tions mandated by the Act: (1) it will serve as guardian ad litem 59 for a
person for whom guardianship is sought, or as plenary or limited guardian, 60
or as successor guardian 61 of the person or estate of a ward; 62 and (2) it will
offer guidance and advice to persons who request such assistance. 63 The
Office of the State Guardian is not limited to representing eligible persons
52. Id. § 715. The Commission, however, is not required to investigate complaints that it
determines to be frivolous or beyond the scope of its authority. Id.
53. Id. § 716. A sua sponte investigation is a voluntary investigation, in which the regional
board acts of "its own will or motion; ... without prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979).
54. G & A Act, supra note 10, §§ 720, 721. The first hearings were held on May 26, 1979,
to discuss administrative matters in connection with Mantino State Hospital.
55. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 723.
56. Id. § 724.
57. Id. § 702(j).
58. See note 29 supra.
59. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed by a court to protect the interests of a
minor who is a defendent in a legal proceeding and "who has no legal guardian who may answer
for him." W. JONES & J. CUNNINGHAM, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE IN THE COUNTY AND
PROBATE COURTS OF ILLINOIS 345 (3d ed. 1903).
60. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 11 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The extent of a guardian's duties
or powers is subject to the discretion of the court. The court can grant full and complete
custody powers to a guardian, or it can make a limited grant of custody. Id. §§ lla-17, 11a-18.
61. Id. § 11. A successor guardian is one whose appointment by the court becomes effective
without further judicial proceedings upon the initially appointed guardian's death, incapacity, or
resignation. Id. § lla-15. Unless modified by the court, the successor guardian's powers and
duties are the same as those of the initially appointed guardian. Id.
62. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 730.
63. Id.
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as defined by the Act,6 4 or serving as the guardian for "developmentally
disabled and mentally ill adults" as recommended by the Governor's Com-
mission. 65 In following its legislative mandate, initially it must work closely
with legal aid groups and the private bar.
The third division, the Legal Advocacy Service, may encounter a staffing
problem. By statute, the Legal Advocacy Service must provide legal counsel
to eligible persons during judicial proceedings arising out of the mental
health laws. 66  Furthermore, the Legal Advocacy Service furnishes legal
counsel to eligible persons in order to enforce any rights or duties created
by the mental health code or related laws. 67 The Legal Advocacy Service
can fulfill these obligations by referring eligible persons to available counsel,
contracting for legal services, or providing its own attorneys. 68 Considering
the limited budget authorized by this legislation, 69 it seems apparent that
the Legal Advocacy Service will not be able to employ a full staff of attor-
neys during the early stages of the Commission's development. Accordingly,
this division will have to provide counsel by referral or by contracting for
services 70 until it is able to employ a full staff of attorneys. The services of
the Legal Advocate will be made available on the basis of a financial
means test with a corresponding fee schedule. 7 1 Realistically, it is anticipated
that the bulk of these services will be provided pro bono to eligible persons.
An administrative problem also exists concerning the Legal Advocacy Serv-
ice. Because a separate Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Serv-
longer exists, 72 there may be some difficulty in the distribution and delinea-
tion of proper legal services to each client. Another potential problem is the
broad definition given to the Advocate's function: to "enforce the rights or
duties arising out of any [of the] mental health or related laws ....... 73 This
suggests that the Advocate may be involved in such matters as the discharge
of persons civilly committed following acquittal by reason of insanity,
74
64. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
65. Report, supra note 1, at 135.
66. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 710(1).
67. Id. § 710(2).68. Id. §711.
69. Id. § 735.
70. The Director has contracted with a consortium of four legal assistance foundations, all of
which receive a majority of their funding from the Legal Services Corporation, to provide a
portion of the legal advocacy services mandated by the Act. Interview with Wallace Winter,
Director of the Legal Advocacy Service of Illinois (Apr. 23, 1980).
71. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 705(i).
72. See note 21 supra.
73. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 710(2).
74. See Comment, Constitutional Standards for Release of the Civilly Committed and Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 233 (1978). For a
comparison of the psychological characteristics of the person civilly committed after a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity with those of other persons who are civilly committed and a dis-
cussion of the implications for release, see Morrow & Peterson, Follow-up of Discharged
Psychiatric Offenders-"Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity" and Criminal Sexual Psychopaths,
57 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 31 (1966).
1980]
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deinstitutionalization, 75 the patient's right to refuse treatment, 76 and a host
of civil problems that arise while an individual is hospitalized or as a result
of hospitalization. 7 7  Currently, additional liaisons with other government
and private agencies, as well as with the private bar, will be needed in order
to ensure adequate protection of legal rights.
Finally, two organizational issues will be top priority for the Commission
early in its existence. 78 The first issue is whether the Human Rights Au-
thority will require a full time administrator or whether a person, such as a
member of the legal staff, functioning as a coordinator of affairs between the
regional authorities and the Commission will suffice. The second issue is
partially contingent on the resolution of the first. If it is determined that a
full-time administrative head is required for the Human Rights Authority,
then each of the three divisions should be represented by a Deputy Direc-
tor. 79  Of course, if it is determined that the Human Rights Authority does
not require a full-time administrative head, the second issue is whether the
administrative heads of the Legal Advocacy Service and the Office of the
State Guardian should be Deputy Directors. Designating the head of each
division as a Deputy Director appears to be an equitable solution. The func-
tions that each division head will be required to perform are of sufficient
magnitude to warrant parity with, if not actual administrative hierarchical
superiority over, the two Deputy Directors.80
The Rights Protected
The Legal Advocacy Service is specifically authorized by the Act to rep-
resent eligible persons "to enforce rights or duties arising out of any mental
health or related laws, local, State or federal." 81 "Rights" are defined in the
Act as "includ[ing] but ...not limited to all rights, benefits, and privileges
75. For a discussion of the deinstitutionalization process and the problems associated with it
see Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 897 (1975); Ewing, Health Planning and Deinstitutionalization: Advocacy Within the
Administrative Process, 31 STAN. L. REv. 679 (1979); Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionaliza-
tion: The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979); Herr, The New Clients:
Legal Services for Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 556-65 (1979).
76. For a discussion of this right see Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liber-
ties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 447, 469-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fer-
leger]; Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755
(1969); Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive De-
velopment of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (1978).
77. For a discussion of such problems see B. ENNIS & L. SIEGAL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL
PATIENTS (1973); Ferleger, supra note 76; Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification,
Token Economics and the Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 81 (1973).
78. Those issues are reflected in the four flow charts that represent the suggested organiza-
tional schemes. See Appendix, figs. I-IV.
79. See Appendix, figs. III & IV.
80. See Appendix, fig. I.
81. G & A Act, supra note 10, § 710(2).
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guaranteed by law, the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and the Con-
stitution of the United States." 82 Thus, the Act grants to an eligible person
not only the full panoply of rights available to any citizen, but also the addi-
tional rights that attach to this special class of individuals. 83 The Legal Ad-
vocacy Service is responsible for upholding this "Bill of Rights" formulated
by the new Mental Health Code (Code).84
Eleven rights are enumerated in the new Code. First and foremost is the
prohibition of discrimination on account of status. The Act states that no
eligible person "shall be deprived of any rights, benefits, or privileges
guaranteed by law, the Constitution of the State of Illinois, or the Con-
stitution of the United States solely on account of the receipt of such serv-
ices."85 In addition, there is no presumption of incompetence. A finding of
82. Id. § 702(h). The Governor's Commission for Revision of the Code perceived this defini-
tion of rights as accomplishing two purposes. First, the definition, would establish a comprehen-
sive investigative power of the rights in Chapter II of the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code, Pub. Act No. 80-1414, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 2-100 to -111 (Supp.
1979) [hereinafter cited as Code]. Second, it will allow the Human Rights Authority great dis-
cretion in determining whether a "right" has been abridged and thus whether an investigation is
appropriate.
83. The Mental Health Code and the Guardianship and Advocacy Act, incorporating the
Code by reference, have attempted to encompass many of the rights that have been judicially
created to benefit mentally handicapped persons. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
576 (1975) (a state may not constitutionally confine a nondangerous person merely because the
individual is "mentally ill" if the person is personally capable of caring for himself or herself or
can receive adequate care with the aid of family or friends); Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305,
1313-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally ill and mentally retarded persons are equally entitled to in-
dividualized treatment plans in a psychologically and physically humane environment); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (individual has a statutory right to treatment, but not
treatment guaranteed to efect a cure); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (an
individual has the right to receive treatment according to the "least restrictive" alternative);
Karmowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-1943-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich.
July 10, 1973) (one who is involuntarily committed to a mental hospital cannot give informed
consent to experimental psychosurgery). See THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT IN
MENTAL HEALTH LAw 46-54, 92-93 (1976) and cases cited therein; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1101 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand,
379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on re-
mand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (warnings similar to Miranda warnings are required
before a psychiatric examination is conducted, and the individual retains the right to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination).
The Mental Health Code, adopting this holding in part, requires the person conducting an
examination for the purpose of certifying a person twelve years of age or older to explain the
purpose of the examination, inform the person that there is no requirement to talk to the
examiner, and alert the individual that any statements made can be used at the court hearing.
Failure to so inform the person bars the examiner from testifying at any subsequent court
hearing concerning the person's admission. Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §
3-208 (Supp. 1979); Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1813 (1979) (burden of proof for com-
mitment is greater than preponderance of evidence standard applicable to other types of civil
cases).
84. Code, supra note 82, § 2-100 to 111.
85. Id. § 2-100. This section establishes the presumption that a recipient of any mental health
treatment or developmental disabilities habilitation may exercise his or her rights equally with
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:475
incompetence can be made only by a court in a proceeding separate from a
judicial hearing leading to admission. 8 6 Each person also has a right to
adequate, humane care and services in the least restrictive environment pos-
sible pursuant to an individualized service plan. 8 7
Another right entitles a person residing in a mental health or developmen-
tal disabilities facility to communicate with persons of his or her choice by
mail, telephone, and visitation, subject to some restrictions.88 The person
may also receive, possess, and use personal property. 89 An eligible person
other persons who have not received such services. See Report, supra note 1, at 21. This is an
expansion of the former Code that only affirmed rights for those persons judicially committed or
hospitalized. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 9-11 (1977). For a discussion of the rights of
persons with mental disabilities, see Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights: Principal Paper, in
THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 3 (1976). Ms. Wald classifies rights into two
categories: personal rights (such as the right to marry, have sexual relations, bear and rear
children), and civil and commercial rights (such as the right to work, vote, contract, hold public
office and serve as a juror).
86. Code, supra note 82, § 2-101. This section differs from the old code in that it requires
separate judicial hearings on the issues of incompetency and admission, assisting the implemen-
tation of the separation actually required under the old code. See Report, supra note 1, at 22.
When incompetency and hospitalization are decided in the same hearing, actual separation
rarely occurs, even though the state code technically separates the two issues. See S. BRAKEL &
R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 252-55 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred
to as BRAKEL & ROCK].
87. Code, supra note 82, § 2-102(a). This section requires the formulation of an individual
services plan. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d
693, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Code, supra note 82, § 2-102(b) provides that a person
can elect services based upon healing through prayer alone. Such "faith healing" services may
be selected either for a minor by the minor's parent or guardian, or on behalf of an adult by his
or her guardian.
88. Code, supra note 82, § 2-103. This section stresses that the communication shall be
"unimpeded, private, and uncensored." It further provides for reasonable accessibility to space
and materials to insure the exercise of this right. Thus, this section creates greater rights for the
patient than the old code. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 12-2 (1977), allowing superintendents
of the facilities great discretion in determining what restrictions were "necessary." See generally
Comment, The Committed Mentally Ill and Their Right to Communicate, 7 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 297 (1971).
The rationale for extending the communication privilege is stated in Morris, Institutionalizing
the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1974). Com-
munication helps reduce depersonalization and isolation. It is often an integral part of treatment
efforts focusing on preparing the patient for reentering the mainstream of life upon release from
the institution. Id. at 1007. In addition, leaving such a valuable tool and right to the discretion
of employees of the institution results in arbitrary use. The new section addresses this problem
by promoting communication that is unimpeded by facility discretion in addition to requiring
that the materials and space for such communication to be made available.
89. Code, supra note 82, § 2-104. This section also states that the resident must be fur-
nished with a reasonable amount of storage space, subject to some restrictions. Possession of
property that may be harmful to the recipient or others may be restricted, provided that notice
is given to all recipients upon admission to the institution. Possession of property that may
cause substantial harm may be restricted by the mental health professional overseeing the serv-
ices plan. All of the recipient's personal property held by the facility shall be returned upon his
or her discharge.
This new section reflects professional, judicial, and legislative approval of the right to use
personal property. The federal court in Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1372
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may use his or her own money as desired unless he or she is a minor or is
prohibited from doing so under a court order.9 0  Employment is permitted
if it is consistent with a person's individual service plan, and wages commen-
surate with the value of the work performed shall be received. 9 1
A person, or his or her representative, shall have the right to refuse serv-
ices unless the services are necessary to prevent the individual from causing
serious harm. 92  Neither restraint 93 nor seclusion 94 may be used as a
(E.D. Pa. 1974), perceived no "legitimate justification" for a state to interfere with a patient's
control and use of his or her property in the absence of evidence that mental patients are
incapable of handling their own finances.
90. Code, supra note 82, § 2-105. This section also states that a service provider or its agent
may not be a representative payee without the person's informed consent for his or her social
security payment, annuity, pension, trust fund payments, or any other form of assistance or
direct payment. The former code allowd the superintendent to act as trustee for all monies
found on the patient at the time of admission to the facility, accrued to the patient during the
period of institutionalized care, or deposited with the superintendent by relatives, friends, or
conservators of the patient. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 100-22 (1977).
The Report of the Governor's Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois
points out that the facility's control over the patient's monies represents a classic conflict of
interest situation, since the institution also collects and levies fees. By requiring the patient's
informed consent before making the facility his or her representative payee, the new section
attempts to ensure that the patient's monies are not confiscated by the facility's employees.
Report, supra note 1, at 26. See also Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations upon Capacity:
Principal Paper, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 74 (1976).
91. Code, supra note 82, § 2-106. Compensating the mentally handicapped promotes the
therapeutic goals. It may give the patient a sense of dignity while abating the patient's sense of
powerlessness and inadequacy. Compensation for labor rendered teaches the patient how to
assume responsibility, as well as enable patients to contribute money for their own or their
families' care. See generally A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSI-
TION 83-96 (1975).
92. Code, supra note 82, § 2-107. This section applies to generally accepted mental health
or developmental services, as well as medication. The right to refuse treatment did not appear
in the old code or the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities rules.
Report, supra note 1, at 28. The report points out that "[t]here is an equal protection argument
against treating . . . persons against their will." Id. For a discussion of this issue, see Schwartz,
In the Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and the Right to Refuse Treatment,
50 NOTRE DAME LAW 808 (1975); Note, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to
Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975).
93. Code, supra note 82, § 2-108. This section prohibits use of restraint solely to punish or
discipline a patient. It also delineates many procedural safeguards such as a written order, the
required specifications of the order, and visual observation of the patient by a physician. No
restraint may be used unless the observing physician has made a determination that the re-
cipient may cause harm to himself or others. Report, supra note 1, at 29, notes that this section
practically duplicates the Department of Mental Health Rule 12.02, although there is no com-
parable provision in the old code.
Restraint is defined as the direct restriction of a person's head, limbs, or body by mechanical
means or physical force. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-125 (Supp. 1979). For a widely ac-
cepted view of proper regulations concerning restraint, see BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 86, at
158-61.
94. Code, supra note 82, § 2-109. This section outlines further safeguards for the individual.
One such safeguard provides that the maximum time for seclusion before re-examination is
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therapeutic measure other than to prevent a person from inflicting physical
harm on another. Also, no person shall receive electro-convulsive therapy or
any unusual, hazardous, or experimental treatment, including psycho-
surgery, without his or her informed and written consent. A parent or guar-
dian may give such consent for a minor only if the court approves. 95
Emergency medical or dental services may be performed on a person who is
not capable of giving informed consent when delay in administering those
services "would endanger the life or adversely and substantially affect the
health" of an eligible person. 96
In addition to these enumerated rights, there are certain statutory duties
that devolve upon the service provider. 97 These procedural duties are de-
signed to safeguard the substantive rights granted to individuals by other
sections of the Act. As such, they are clearly legally enforceable rights.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
With passage of the Act and the amendments, 9 Illinois joins a select
group of jurisdictions that have created statutorily an independent agency to
oversee the functions of state and private mental health services. 99 The
extent of protection given to mentally disabled persons, however, varies
from state to state.
limited to eight hours. Such treatment may not be imposed without a written order from a
physician. In addition, a trained staff member must monitor the secluded person closely. Re-
port, supra note 1, at 30, found that the old code contains no comparable provision, although
the Department of Mental Health Rule 12.06 contains a similar safeguard.
"Seclusion" is the sequestration of an individual alone in a room that he or she is unable to
leave. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-126 (Supp. 1979).
95. Code, supra note 82, § 2-110. This section differs from Department of Mental Health
Rule 12.03 in that it requires informed consent and refusal by a competent person to grant
consent cannot be overruled by the court. For a discussion of the informed consent issue, see
Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1970).
96. Code, supra note 82, § 2-111. This section expands the former code's definition of
"emergency" to allow clearly appropriate medical and dental treatment in numerous situations
that are not "life-threatening." See the former code definition at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §
1-8 (1977). See also BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 86, at 161.
97. These duties include: (1) notifying the eligible person orally and in writing of the rights
guaranteed; (2) conspicuously posting a summary of these rights in public areas or facilities
providing services; and (3) immediately notifying the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission,
or whoever the person so designates, when rights enumerated by the Mental Health Code are
restricted. Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 2-200 to -202 (Supp. 1979).
98. See note 10 supra.
99. The American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled has prepared a
listing of mental disability advocates that includes private individuals, community advocacy
programs, public defenders, legal aid services, and state agency advocates. This list indicates
that only Ohio, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and New Jersey have formulated a government
agency, independent of any state-controlled department of mental health, to serve as an advo-
cate for the mentally disabled. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY
DISABLED, MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCATES (1978).
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Ohio established a Legal Rights Service in 1976. The first sentence of the
statute creating the service, however, reads as follows: "A legal rights service
is hereby created and established to protect and advocate the rights of per-
sons with developmental disabilities .... ."100 Thus, it appears that the
Ohio Legal Rights Service is not mandated to furnish services to persons
suffering from mental disabilities. The Ohio Legal Rights Service, however,
conceives its function to be broader than serving the developmentally dis-
abled. It envisions taking responsibility for representing all persons in men-
tal hospitals, all persons threatened with hospitalization, and all persons who
have been hospitalized in mental hospitals. To date there has been no chal-
lenge to the statutory authority of the Legal Rights Service in Ohio to go
beyond serving the developmentally disabled. 10 1
Although the Louisiana Legislature created a Mental Health Advocacy Serv-
ice in 1977,102 no specific funding was ever made available. 10 3 The service,
therefore, exists only on paper. In 1974, the Rhode Island mental health
laws established a Mental Health Advocate 104 to be appointed for five-year
terms by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 10 5 This
Mental Health Advocate may appoint a staff 106 to assist in fulfilling duties
that are essentially the same as those required of the Illinois Legal Advocacy
Service.107
Unquestionably, the most far-reaching mental health advocacy statute is
found in New Jersey. 10 8 In 1974, the Department of Public Advocate was
created at a cabinet level. It consists of several divisions: the Division of
Administration, the Office of Inmate Advocacy within the Office of Public
Defender, the Division of Rate Counsel, the Division of Mental Health Ad-
vocacy, the Division of Public Interest Advocacy, and the Division of Citizen
Complaints and Dispute Settlement. 10 9 The nature of these divisions
suggests a more broadly conceived consumer-oriented advocate than the of-
fice envisioned under the Act in Illinois.
With the approval of the Public Advocate of New Jersey, the Director of
the Division of Mental Health Advocacy can employ the necessary number
of full-time assistants to perform the Mental Health Advocate's duties. Addi-
tionally, the Director may retain other expert assistants on a temporary
basis."10 The services of the Mental Health Advocate are limited to provid-
100. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.94 (Page Supp. 1979).
101. Interview with Douglas Rogers, Executive Director of the Ohio Legal Rights Service
(Dec. 1978).
102. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:64 (West Supp. 1979).
103. Id.
104. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-13 (1977).
105. id. § 40.1-5-14.
106. Id. § 40.1-5-15.
107. Id. § 40.1-5-22.
108. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-1 to 52.27E-47 (West Supp. 1979).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 52:27E-22.
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ing assistance to indigent mental hospital patients concerning their admis-
sion, retention, and release from confinement in a hospital, institution, or
facility. 11' The Mental Health Advocate also may represent indigent mental
hospital admittees in class actions, as well as individually, concerning their
dealings with state, county, or local governmental departments."12
The mental health advocacy concept is gaining support on both state and
federal levels. 113 Thus, although Illinois has joined what is presently a
select group, this group will undoubtedly increase in the future. Jurisdic-
tions that have created a state agency independent of a Department of Men-
tal Health can serve as monitors for public and private providers of mental
health services. It should be noted, however, that it is essential for the effec-
tive operation of an advocate that the position be independent of a Depart-
ment of Mental Health.
PROBLEM AREAS AND THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE
The future of the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission will be deter-
mined largely by its ability to carry out functions delineated by the Act. To
do so it must resolve the problems already enunciated, such as organ-
izational structure and staffing plans. The dedication of the Director and staff
to active and creative protection of the disadvantaged groups entrusted to
their aegis will set a precedent for the quality of the agency's future opera-
tion.
Various areas of concern can be anticipated. Three are articulated as ques-
tions that will be answered by the Commission when it establishes short-
range goals: First, does the authority of the Commission extend to federal
hospitals or facilities in Illinois serving citizens of Illinois who are admitted
pursuant to the Illinois Mental Health Code? Second, does the Act's refer-
ence to private service providers constitute sufficient state action to bring
them under the ambit of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause?
Third, does the extension of the Mental Health Code to minors suggest that
the Commission will become somewhat of a Juvenile Advocate?
The answers to these questions ultimately may be in the affirmative. Not-
withstanding an affirmative response, the methods used to arrive at answers
to these and similar questions will indicate the extent of the agency's impact
upon the protection of the rights of persons entrusted to it.
111. Id. § 52:27E-24.
112. Id. § 52:27E-25.
113. See MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS' RIGHTS (1977)
(U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare Pub. No. 77-455); 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
REP. 65 (1977).
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